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Abstract—Shared Web Hosting service enables hosting 
multitude of websites on a single powerful server. It is a well-
known solution as many people share the overall cost of 
server maintenance and also, website owners do not need to 
deal with administration issues is not necessary for website 
owners. In this paper, we illustrate how shared web hosting 
service works and demonstrate the security weaknesses rise 
due to the lack of proper isolation between different 
websites, hosted on the same server. We exhibit two new 
server-side attacks against the log file whose objectives are 
revealing information of other hosted websites which are 
considered to be private and arranging other complex 
attacks. In the absence of isolated log files among websites, 
an attacker controlling a website can inspect and manipulate 
contents of the log file. These attacks enable an attacker to 
disclose file and directory structure of other websites and 
launch other sorts of attacks. Finally, we propose several 
countermeasures to secure shared web hosting servers 
against the two attacks subsequent to the separation of log 
files for each website. 
Keywords—Shared Web Hosting; Server-Side Attack; Log 
Poisoning; Log Snooping 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays with Internet popularity increasing, many 
people are creating their own websites. In order to 
publish, many people prepare their own dedicated servers. 
But with the increase in hardware power, it is possible to 
host several websites on a single physical server. This 
kind of web hosting is commonly known as shared web 
hosting. In shared web hosting, the physical resources are 
shared among different websites simultaneously. Also, the 
administration of the webserver is handled by web hosting 
providers and owners of these websites do not need much 
information and experiences about the administration of 
their websites. However, limited resources force users to 
suffer from low performance. Furthermore, shared web 
hosting servers have some security issues since there is no 
proper isolation between different websites [1]. 
According to the Zone-H site, the world has witnessed an 
increasing number of website defacements [2]. In other 
words, websites that are co-located with a vulnerable 
website on a physical server might be in danger too and a 
noticeable number of defacements are released in only 
one IP or physical server mass deface [3,4]. 
In this paper, we introduce two novel server-side 
attacks against the log management system of webservers 
in shared web hosting servers: Log Poisoning and Log 
Snooping. In order to be vulnerable to these attacks, a 
webserver must be setup with default configuration in 
respect to how logs are stored, thus an attacker who 
controls a website hosted on a shared web hosting server 
is able to attack all other websites hosted on the same 
webserver. In other words, he is able to manipulate logs 
of other websites (Log Poisoning) or to inspect their logs 
(Log Snooping). This way, an attacker can steal private 
information, reveal file and directory structure of 
websites, and use these attacks to launch other complex 
attacks. 
In this paper, we focus on the Apache webserver to 
present the attacks. According to Netcraft [5], Apache 
webserver has the highest usage among other webservers 
such as Microsoft IIS. Since most countermeasures are 
developed for POSIX operating systems, this study 
mainly focuses on Linux operating system. Also, we use 
PHP programming language because of higher popularity, 
usability and reliability. However, the discussed attacks 
are not unique to Apache webserver and every webserver 
installed with certain configuration is potentially 
vulnerable to aforementioned attacks. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In 
Section  II the overall architecture of shared web hosting 
servers is portrayed. We describe two novel server-side 
attacks against log file in Section  III. In Section  IV, we 
present other complex attacks which can be launched as a 
result of two aforementioned server-side attacks. In 
Section  V, we present several countermeasures against 
server-side attacks and we conclude our paper in 
Section  VI. 
II. SHARED WEB HOSTING ARCHITECTURE 
In this section we discuss the details of shared web 
hosting architecture to obtain a better view for 
understanding the attacks presented in Section  III. In 
shared web hosting, a webserver is hosting many 
websites, simultaneously. The website owner has a FTP 
account which can upload new files for his website and 
uploaded files are owned by the owner user account. A 
webserver run as a specific user account (apache, daemon, 
and www-data) and handles all HTTP requests for all 
websites. So, webserver must be able to read the files on 
each website. However, in some Content Management 
Systems (CMS), the users must be able to upload files and 
therefore webserver needs the write access to website 
directories besides read access. Fig. 1 depicts the 
necessary permissions for Apache webserver in Linux 
operating system where web1 and web2 are Linux users 
and owners of two different websites hosted on the shared 
web hosting server. 
 
Figure 1. Essential Permissions for Apache Webserver 
In shared web hosting, there are two general forms of 
webserver configuration for executing) scripts as below: 
• Configure webserver to load the script interpreter as 
a webserver module. 
• Configure webserver to run the script interpreter as 
a CGI binary. 
A webserver module is loaded by webserver process 
or is compiled into the webserver binary, which means the 
webserver process contains a binary image of the 
interpreter. A CGI is executed as a single process for each 
request, meaning that the webserver will create a new 
interpreting process for each arriving request. Using script 
interpreter as webserver module is more stable under load 
and much more efficient in handling requests and 
resource management, than the CGI mode. But CGI mode 
is more secure because malicious scripts do not affect 
webserver process. 
III. LOG FILE ATTACKS 
Web servers usually store the information of 
processed requests in a log file. A log file usually includes 
some information like Domain Name, Client IP, Request 
Time, Request Type (GET or POST), Requested 
Filename, and Size of Transferred File and Return Status 
Code from webserver. The two attacks presenting are 
based on this fact that webserver uses a single file for 
storing logs of various websites and the log file is 
accessible by every script executed by the webserver. 
These weaknesses enable an attacker to open log file in a 
write mode and modify logs residing on the same 
webserver (Log Poisoning). It also allows the attacker 
scripts to open log file, inspect logs of other websites and 
misuse the information that is supposed to be private (Log 
Snooping). The details of these attacks are presented in 
the following two sections. 
A. Log Poisoning 
In shared web hosting with default configuration, log 
file can be modified only by the root user and is only 
readable by other users. On the other hand, webserver 
should have a permission to write in log file, regardless of 
the user account that is run with. Therefore, in most 
webservers like Apache, parent webserver is executed 
with root privilege and child webservers are run by parent 
webserver to handle the requests. In some operating 
systems like Linux, file descriptors opened by parent 
process, will be inherited to child processes. This way, 
parent webserver can open the log file in write mode and 
fork child webservers to allow them to write in log file. 
Thus, log file descriptor is inherited by child webservers 
and consequently they can modify log file although they 
are not run with root privilege. Since scripts of websites 
hosted on the shared web hosting server are usually 
executed by child webserver processes, they are able to 
modify the log file. In Log Poisoning attack, an attacker 
creates a script to find log file descriptor and open the log 
file in write mode. For instance, in Linux operating 
system, information about open files of each process 
exists in /proc/PID/fd, in which PID is the process ID. 
Then, an attacker creates a PHP script to find the open 
files of child webserver process which executes the script 
and re-opens the log file with write access. The sample 
PHP script for Log Poisoning attack is shown in Fig. 2. 
To be susceptible to this attack, Apache must use PHP 
interpreter as an Apache module because when Apache 
runs PHP interpreter as CGI, the new PHP interpreter 
process does not inherit log file descriptor from Apache, 
so the malicious PHP script is not able to re-open log file 
with write access and modify its content. 
Having the write access to the log file, attackers can 
do malicious tasks like clearing other website requests in 
order to cover track of their penetration or adding some 
fake requests to the log file. Generally, it is true to say 
that write access to log file in shared web hosting servers 
has harmful consequences and attackers can accomplish 
various attacks on victim websites by poisoning the log 
file. 
B. Log Snooping 
In default configuration, log file is readable by all 
users. So, webserver user can read the log file and 
consequently all scripts run by the webserver are able to 
read the contents of log file. Therefore, scripts of a 
website are able to read the logs of other websites located 
on the same shared web hosting server. In Log Snooping 
attack, an attacker searches the victim website logs to 
retrieve important information and use the information to 
follow malicious activities. Unlike Log Poisoning attack, 
Log Snooping attack is feasible in two modes which 
webserver runs the script interpreter (Module or CGI). 
 Figure 2. Log Poisoning Script (PHP-Module Mode) 
 
Figure 3. Log Snooping Script (PHP-Module Mode) 
 
Figure 4. Log Snooping Script (PHP-CGI Mode) 
If the webserver administrator made the log file 
unreadable for other users, attacker can use the PHP script 
shown in Fig. 3 to accomplish Log Snooping attack. Also, 
Fig. 4 access to the log file enables attackers to access 
much useful information. One of the most important 
information is the structure of files and folders of victim 
websites. Attacker can reconstruct the site tree using the 
requested URLs and be informed about the names of 
website files and folders. For example, in several 
hardening best practices, the name of administrator 
authentication page is changed in order to prevent the 
attackers from entering administration panel. But with 
using site tree, attacker can bypass this technique and find 
the authentication page. Then the attacker can use 
techniques like SQL Injection to obtain hashed password 
of administrator and find clear password text by using 
brute force of encoded password or using brute force for 
both user and password in order to obtain admin login 
credentials. It is important to know that if the attacker 
does not have access to the shared web hosting server, he 
will not be able to find the authentication page easily. 
IV. RESULTING ATTACKS 
The Log Poisoning and Log Snooping attacks can be 
used as intermediate steps to accomplish other attacks 
against the websites residing on a shared web hosting 
server. The resulting attacks will be presented in the 
following sections with more details. 
A. Executing Malicious Code 
Log Poisoning attack enables attackers to execute 
malicious codes with vulnerable website rights. Some 
websites are vulnerable since they allow special code 
reuse by including files. In other words, users supply the 
values of some parameters used in URL in order to 
include desired files. In this case, attackers try to misuse 
and include some malicious files. One of the most 
common attacks in this area is known as Local File 
Inclusion (LFI) [6] which leads in including victim server 
local files [7]. During recent years, several methods such 
as LFI2RCE [8,9] are proposed which are able to execute 
remote code using LFI attack. One of such methods is 
adding some malicious code to the log file of webserver 
and including the log file by LFI which leads in execution 
of malicious code by victim website. However, without 
having access to the local victim file system, poisoning 
the log file is a complicated and hard task and, sometimes 
impossible. In shared web hosting servers, using Log 
Poisoning attack, an attacker can add some malicious 
code to the log file easily and accomplish the LFI2RCE 
attack. 
B. Drawing Site Tree 
As mentioned before, if an attacker reads the 
webserver log file, he will be able to draw the site tree 
which includes file and directory names of different 
websites and use this information in dangerous ways. In 
many web vulnerability scanners, crawling is definitely 
the most important part due to this that the scanner might 
miss vulnerabilities. So if the crawling engine is weak, the 
scanner will certainly miss the vulnerabilities [10]. If an 
intruder has access to victim webserver log file, he can 
draw an accurate site tree like as web vulnerability and 
pass this arguably phase. In other words, accurate site tree 
is the first step of successful penetration testing cycle. 
C. Finding Co-located Websites 
Depending on the configuration of webserver, there 
are various methods for identifying the websites hosted on 
the shared web hosting server. The attacker can write a 
script to list directories recursively and finds the names of 
co-located websites. Also, using Log Snooping attack, 
attacker is able to find co-located websites. As mentioned 
before, there is a variety of information about client 
requests available in the log file. One is the virtual host 
name or website domain name that is serving the request. 
Hence, the attacker can read the content of log file and list 
the names of websites that are located on the server. 
D. Revealing Sensitive Information 
Generally most developers send authentication tokens 
(usernames, passwords, session identifiers) via GET 
variables and because webserver records information 
provided by GET variables, sensitive information reveals 
in case of Log Snooping. For instance, consider the below 
URL which is sent to the victim website, once the submit 
button on authentication page is clicked: 
https://www.victim.com/login?user=admin&pass=plain_or_hash_pass 
Most webservers with default configuration log this GET 
request with related parameters in clear text. Therefore, an 
intruder can use this information to login to the victim 
website as a valid user. 
V. COUNTERMEASURES 
Since using shared web hosting is popular, securing 
the solution is a more proper idea than skipping this 
service. For this purpose, several methods have been 
proposed in order to make a more secure shared web 
hosting installation [11,12,13,14,15]. In this section, we 
present countermeasures developed for Apache webserver 
on Linux and how it confronts the server-side attacks 
described in Section  III. If we examine these attacks 
carefully, we can figure out the main cause of the attacks 
is the lack of proper isolation between log files of 
different websites. 
In default configuration, webservers use a single log 
file for recording request of all websites hosted on the 
shared web hosting server. In order to stop exampled 
attacks against log file, it is a common practice to create 
separate log file for each website and put log files in 
separate directories [16]. A sample configuration in 
Apache webserver for creating separate log file for each 
virtual host website is shown in Fig. 5. In addition, the 
proper permissions must be set on the log file directories 
as the malicious scripts cannot read from or write on 
them. The necessary permissions on log file directories in 
Linux operating system are depicted in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6, 
web1 and web2 are owners of the corresponding websites. 
In default configuration, Apache is executed by a 
unique user who has access to every website. A guessable 
idea is that Apache runs each website by its owner user 
account. Therefore, different methods have been 
introduced for Apache in the past years. As the first 
attempts, suEXEC [17] and suPHP [18] have been 
introduced as Apache modules. The suEXEC is a wrapper 
binary file and an Apache module. When a HTTP request 
arrives, Apache runs the wrapper and finds the script 
name and User/Group ID [1]. This module can only be 
used with CGI [19] or FastCGI [20] programs. 
 Figure 5. Log Separation in Apache for Each Website 
 
Figure 6. Necessary Permissions for Log Files’ Directories in Linux 
In order to install suEXEC, you must prepare a unique 
CGI or FastCGI binary file for each website and user and 
group ID of the owner must be set as owner of website. 
To be mentioned, using suEXEC with CGI has very low 
performance in a way that Chary has named it as a 
performance killer [12]. Same as suEXEC, suPHP runs 
PHP scripts with the specified user and group ID. In 
contrast to suEXEC, there is no need of a unique CGI or 
FastCGI binary file for each website with suPHP module. 
Also as same as suEXEC, suPHP suffers from low 
performance [1]. 
When Apache 2.0 has been released, different 
MPM [21] methods have been introduced. Some of them 
are developed to solve the shared web hosting security 
problem. Sean Gabriel Heacock introduced Peruser 
MPM [22]. Peruser MPM uses processes instead of 
threads to handle requests. This MPM runs a control 
Apache process as root privilege and the control process 
creates several multiplexer processes with Apache user 
privilege. The multiplexer process listens on port 80, 
accepts incoming requests and reads the request to check, 
from destination website. Then, it passes the request to 
relevant worker process to handle it. The worker 
processes run under the user and group ID of respective 
website owners. Also the control process always 
maintains a pool of idle worker processes to increase the 
performance [1]. 
Another relevant MPM introduced by Steinar 
Gunderson is ITK MPM [23]. ITK MPM creates a 
managing Apache process with Root privilege. The 
managing process spawns several listeners with root 
privilege. The listener process listen on port 80 and 
handles new request to determine which website it is. 
Then, it creates a new Apache handler process with user 
and group ID of website owner to serve the request. But, 
the main difference of ITK MPM with Peruser MPM is 
that after the request has been completed, the handler 
Apache process is terminated. In other words, ITK MPM 
does not maintain a pool of idle handler processes for 
serving the requests. Due to this, ITK MPM is a good 
solution, if the server has high number of users. 
According to [15], the ITK MPM solution behaves 
relatively well in all aspects. However, allocating separate 
log file for each website does not seem a perfect solution 
all the time, since by increasing number of websites; it 
will cause some problems with insufficient file 
descriptors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Shared web hosting is the most common type of web 
hosting due to its low monthly costs and the need of 
almost no knowledge and experience from the customer 
side for administration of their websites. However, the 
websites hosted on the shared web hosting servers suffer 
from some security weaknesses. 
This paper addressed two novel server-side attacks 
which exploit the lack of proper isolation between the log 
files of different websites resided on a shared web hosting 
server. We demonstrated that webservers using a single 
log file to store website logs are prone to an attacker in 
control of a website hosted on a shared web hosting server 
can manipulate and inspect logs of other websites hosted 
on the same server, thus the attacker is able to steal 
private information, reveal file and directory structures of 
other websites and conduct other complex attacks. 
Eventually, we presented countermeasures and how they 
secure the shared web hosting installations. 
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